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Abstract This Bulletin stems from a dissatisfaction with the way in 
which the idea of ‘the market’ or ‘the free market’ is currently used in 
conventional discourse on development issues. One notion is particularly 
dominant, implicitly or explicitly: ‘the market’ seen as a flexible, atomistic 
realm of impersonal exchange and dispersed competition, characterized 
by voluntary transactions on an equal basis between autonomous, usually 
private, entities with material motivations. This etiolated model of the 
market derives from the universe of neo-classical economists and, in the 
world of development policy, serves to provide intellectual support for their 
prescriptions. This ‘ideal-type’ market has been elevated to the level of an 
ideological principle and ethical ideal, providing a policy panacea which 
promises both efficiency, prosperity and freedom. The main theme of this 
Bulletin reflects my own concern as a political scientist that, by and large, 
conventional economic theory, in most of its manifold incarnations, has 
either ignored or downplayed the role of power in economic processes 
generally and in markets in particular.
1 INTRODUCTION
The basic rationale for attempting a political analysis of  markets has 
been briefly laid out in the Editorial Introduction to this Bulletin. 
During the 1980s, ‘the market’, or the ‘free market’ became the 
key catchword of  international development discourse and took 
on virtually magical qualities as a developmental panacea. In the 
world of  ideas, it was an intellectual juggernaut given political force 
(and therefore intellectual credibility) not only by the dominance of  
neo‑liberalism in the key metropolitan countries (notably ‘Reaganomics’ 
and ‘Thatcherism’), but also by the notion of  ‘market socialism’ in 
the former (and, in the case of  China, still) state socialist countries. 
As a powerful ideological slogan, it had to rely only partly on its 
intellectual and practical plausibility. I have been constantly appalled 
by the simplistic way in which ‘the market’ is introduced into policy 
debates, not the least in the Chinese context with which I am the most 
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familiar, where ‘the market’ has taken on the aura of  an unproblematic 
economic and political saviour. 
Fortunately, some of  the ideological dust seems to be settling in the 
early 1990s and the time is ripe for a basic reconsideration of  both 
the concept and the reality of  markets. Much of  the intellectual and 
practical case for the beneficial economic consequences of  markets is 
now widely accepted across the political spectrum. Now we need to 
take our understanding of  markets one step further. At the conceptual 
level, it is important to move analysis away from an overly abstract, 
simplified and ideologically loaded conception of  markets which, when 
fed into policy, can have damaging results. To do this, it is necessary to 
go beyond the rarefied categories of  conventional economic analysis: 
through innovation within economics itself  and the introduction of  
ideas from other disciplines, ideally fused or overlapping in a cross‑
disciplinary fashion. At the empirical level, an effort to ‘deconstruct’ 
the market is all the more pressing in a new global politico‑economic 
context in which the old polarity between ‘centrally planned’ and 
‘market economies’ has been replaced by a situation in which, while 
only ‘market economies’ are on offer, it is becoming increasingly clear 
that there is a wide range of  variation between market economies. 
Today, we talk about the differences between Japanese and Western 
capitalist market economies; in future we will have to talk with much 
more precision about a far wider variety of  market economies which 
differ in fundamental ways (Korean capitalism, Chinese capitalism, 
Brazilian capitalism). If  the neo-classically derived paradigm of  ‘the 
market’ was inadequate in the past in elucidating the dynamics of  real 
markets, so much more in the future as the range of  systemic diversity 
increases. The kind of  analysis presented in this Bulletin represents 
merely one component of  a much wider intellectual and practical 
dissatisfaction with the conventional paradigm of  the market and its 
practical effects in the industrialized, industrializing and Third Worlds.
2 A POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF MARKETS
The main points of  my argument have already been stated in the 
Introduction to this Bulletin. The abstract conception of  the market 
deriving from neoclassical economics overrides variations in real 
markets which are very important for considering and tackling 
practical problems of  development. (For this issue, see Mackintosh 
1990.) It also abstracts from social, political and institutional aspects 
of  real markets which cannot be dismissed as ‘exogenous’ factors but are 
inherent, and indeed may be essential, characteristics of  the functioning 
of  markets in the real world. In particular, conventional economic 
analysis of  markets by and large ignores or marginalizes the presence 
of  power which is a glaringly visible characteristic of  real markets and 
a political analysis of  markets is needed to reveal the manifold ways in 
which power and power relations influence the structure and operation 
of  real markets. Using a power‑based notion of  the ‘political’, one can 
classify the politics of  markets into at least four major forms: the politics 
of  state involvement; the politics of  market organization; the politics of  
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market structure; and the politics of  social embeddedness. My purpose 
here is to discuss these ideas and arguments in more detail.
First, we need to be more clear about the notion of  power. The concept 
is much discussed and contested. (For valuable treatments of  the 
concept, see Bardhan 1991 and Lukes 1986.) Much of  the discussion 
tends to revolve around what could be called a behavioural and a 
structural view of  power. The first concentrates on power mainly in 
dyadic relationships between two agents; superior power is reflected 
in the ability of  agent A to influence the calculations and behaviour 
of  agent B to the effect that agent B chooses to do something which 
he/she otherwise would not have done (with the implication that B 
is somehow worse off as a consequence). If  one views a market as 
made up of  a myriad of  individual exchanges, this micro‑level notion 
of  power is essential for understanding the specific dynamics of  each 
exchange event. However, the behavioural notion of  power has severe 
limitations. It tends to take the initial endowments of  power resources 
of  each agent as given and is not concerned to inquire whence they 
came, preferring to focus on the mechanics whereby power is exercised. 
However, each real market is a patterned set of  social relations with its 
own specific constellation of  power; if  the power relation involved in a 
micro‑level market exchange is to be understood, therefore, it must be 
situated in the context of  a structural analysis of  this wider system. The 
power-patterning of  markets affects an agent’s choice by determining 
the boundaries of  available choices, influencing the operational calculus 
of  the chooser and shaping the relative attractiveness of  various choices. 
A combination of  behavioural and structural analysis also allows us 
to capture the dynamics of  the operation of  power within markets as 
a systemic process in which agents make their own market history, as 
it were, though not within circumstances of  their own choosing. Just 
as spectacles are usually preferable to monocles for good vision, the 
behavioural and the structural conceptions of  power are both essential 
to understanding power in markets.
If  we incorporate this idea of  power within our understanding of  
markets, their characteristic economic features embody political 
processes of  conflict and cooperation and political relations of  
domination and subordination. From this viewpoint, therefore, market 
man or woman is less interested in bartering and trucking’ or making 
rational choices in response to given signals and more interested in 
seeking to protect, consolidate or extend their power within the market. 
For example, Victor Keegan (The Guardian, 9 June, 1991), commenting 
on an OECD report warning about the escalating dangers of  oligopoly 
in the industrialized world, notes wryly that ‘The natural state of  
the sentient capitalist is one of  unqualified monopoly, with qualified 
monopoly as decidedly second‑best, but often the condition to which 
competition and regulation reduce him’.
This notion of  the market as an arena of  power struggle between 
competing interests is conveyed well by Alan Cawson who notes (1988) 
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that: ‘The real world of  trade politics is a far cry from the notion of  
competition as an impersonal mechanism for allocating resources, and 
much closer to the idea of  economics as war pursued by peaceful means’. 
Here Cawson is drawing explicitly on an intellectual tradition deriving 
from Max Weber who made a similar analysis of  prices and money: 
Money prices are the product of  conflicts of  interest and of  
compromises; they thus result from power constellations. Money is 
not a mere ‘voucher for unspecified utilities’, which could be altered 
at will without any fundamental effect on the character of  the 
price system as a struggle of  man against man. ‘Money’ is, rather, 
primarily a weapon in this struggle; [money prices] are instruments 
of  calculation only as estimated quantifications of  relative chances in 
this struggle of  interests:  
(Weber (1922) 1978: 108, cited in Granovetter 1992:8–9)
Weber is referring here to the specific instrumentalities of  economic 
power. However, power is a protean phenomenon and power resources 
in markets are many and various. We would therefore wish to extend 
our analysis to involve four dimensions of  market power – the 
state, association, economic assets and socio‑cultural status (labelled 
p1 to p4 for ease of  reference). Each of  these constitutes the basis for 
a specific form of  market politics. The substance of  market politics 
is characteristically about a number of  issues: about the position of  
an agent or agents in relation to others within a market and their 
differential ability to extract resources through exchanges with other 
market participants; about the rules of  the game and the nature of  
market institutions; and about the boundaries of  the market (for 
example, with the public sector or the household). Participants in the 
politics of  a specific market may involve both actors in that market, 
actors in other markets with intersecting exchanges and interests, and in 
other social spheres, such as the family or the state. 
With these analytical clarifications in mind, we can now investigate each 
of  the four categories of  market politics in more detail.
π1 The Politics of State Involvement 
This is the most familiar arena of  market politics since it is commonly 
discussed under the rubric of  the state‑market paradigm. Our analysis 
differs from the latter in two respects. First, the conventional state-
market paradigm predisposes us to think in dichotomous terms of  two 
distinct spheres: on the one side, there is the realm of  politics which 
has to do with the state and other institutions making up the system of  
formal public politics; on the other side, there is the realm of  economics 
in which economic agents of  diverse kinds produce, exchange and 
distribute through the modality of  markets. In the real world, of  course, 
the realms of  state and market, public political and economic systems, 
are densely and inextricably intertwined. Second, rather than separate 
the realms of  politics and economics as the state‑market paradigm 
does, we regard both the state/public political system and the economy 
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as matrices of  politics – from this perspective, ‘economic’ events and 
processes are not ‘outside politics’ or ‘non‑political’ but themselves 
embody diverse forms of  politics.
State involvement in markets takes two common forms. The first 
is when the state, usually through one of  its specific institutional 
components, is a direct participant in a market through direct control 
over production, accumulation or exchange (for example, industrial 
parastatals or state farms, state banks, agricultural marketing boards). 
State enterprises may play a monopolistic role in the provision of  
key industrial inputs to downstream private firms, notably energy 
and basic raw materials such as steel and coal. The state may play a 
crucial monopsonistic or hegemonic purchasing role in a variety of  
markets: for example, as contractor for the services of  private defence 
and telecommunications industries in Western European nations 
(Cawson et al. 1990) or in the purchase of  agricultural produce in many 
developing countries. In the latter case, the work of  Jonathan Barker 
(1989) and Robert Bates (1981) has been particularly valuable in tracing 
the political dynamics of  interactions between state agencies and 
peasant producers in the context of  African agricultural markets. Bates, 
for example, analysed African agricultural markets as political arenas 
characterized by specific constellations of  conflicting political actors and 
interests and showed how these political dynamics led to consequences 
which were economically deleterious but, from the point of  view of  
state actors at least, political rational.
The second dimension of  state involvement in markets is that of  
regulation, a phenomenon which has several layers of  market 
penetration. The first layer is the relatively superficial one of  
parametric policy intervention by the government of  the day to 
facilitate market operations, correct market distortions, achieve social 
or developmental goals and the like. At a deeper level, the state’s 
involvement is pervasive; it is the source of  a complex network of  
institutionalized arrangements which permeate markets and influence 
the way they operate: for example, the legal definition of  property 
rights, licensing laws, standardization of  weights and measures, creation 
and validation of  money and the regulation of  contracts. At an even 
deeper level, state power saturates market exchange in invisible ways, 
an immanent quality which is redolent of  Michel Foucault’s ‘capillary’ 
notion of  power which acts to ‘permeate, characterise and constitute 
the social body’ (Foucault 1976, in Lukes 1986, 228). For example, in 
the context of  a highly developed consumer market characterized by a 
dense network of  state regulation built up coral‑like over a long period, 
a simple transaction such as buying a bar of  chocolate is saturated by 
state power, which may regulate hours of  sale, precise measurement 
or description of  contents, the positioning of  chocolate on the counter 
and its proximity to other goods, the environmental soundness of  its 
wrapping, the price paid and the nature and value of  the money used to 
pay for it, and so on (and this is disregarding other provisions regarding 
its production and distribution).
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The nature and degree of  this institutionalized saturation by state power 
is intellectually important for classifying different types of  markets 
and measuring their degree of  ‘maturity’ and practically important 
in conditioning their operational effectiveness. This ‘institutional 
patterning’ of  markets by state power needs more investigation since 
one of  the features of  the development of  markets seems to be that this 
role is increasingly transferred from more traditional social institutions 
such as kinship, religion or locality (which we discuss under the heading 
of  π4) to the modern state, a process of  historical ‘re-embedding’.
π2 The Politics of Market Organization
This is a form of  power and politics internal to the market, whereby 
participants in the market act to alter the operation of  the market to 
favour their own interests and enhance their capacity to pursue them. 
They may do this among themselves or in cooperation/conflict with 
actors outside their specific market (in the state or in other markets). To 
the extent that their action results in the creation of  established rules 
of  the game or institutionalized practices within the market, this form 
of  politics can result in what might be called ‘endogenous regulation’. 
At its roots, this represents an attempt to achieve ‘organizational 
transcendence’ of  the market through various forms of  collective action.
From a Weberian perspective, this can be seen in terms of  two 
concomitant and competing processes: social closure or usurpation. 
Successful social closure undertaken through the collective action of  
market participants results in the establishment of  conditions which 
protect or extend the market position of  those actors, often at the 
expense of  other groups within the market. Usurpation represents a 
counter‑attack by threatened or subordinated actors, such as workers 
or consumers, to improve their power within the market (these 
notions are discussed in depth by Parkin 1979). As Cawson (1988) 
remarks, these ‘social bonds which develop out of  self‑interest between 
“competitors”… are not an aberration from the free market but define 
the essence of  the exercise of  power in the market’. 
The exercise of  associational power takes a number of  commonly 
observable forms, of  which three are particularly important: formal 
association, network and hierarchy.
Formal association provides much of  the substance of  the politics 
of  ‘civil society’ and takes a wide variety of  forms, e.g. business 
associations, commodity cartels, trade unions, consumer groups and 
professional associations. For example, highly skilled professionals 
provide classic examples of  occupational groups which feel themselves 
threatened by a potentially fully‑functioning competitive market and 
organize to evade or transcend it. Their strategy is based on what 
is called ‘credentialism’ (which is a major symptom of  the ‘diploma 
disease’) which gives rise to institutionalized mechanisms operating 
to define and protect their own privileged position in the market and 
to limit the claims of  other (actual or potential) market participants. 
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Obvious cases which spring to mind are the medical and the legal 
professions.
This phenomenon raises interesting questions about the role played 
by the formal associations of  ‘civil society’ within the market. Current 
political discourse tends to regard civil society as a ‘good thing’, 
particularly as a bulwark for freedom and autonomy in the face of  
potential state Leviathans. But what about its role in relation to the 
market? Opinion is much more divided on this issue. Some argue 
that the exercise of  associational power has a negative economic 
or developmental effect since it creates unearned rents and thereby 
distorts the ‘proper’ operation of  markets; others argue that such 
organizations may have many positive effects, for example in amassing 
and distributing information, setting and monitoring standards, and 
providing mechanisms for arbitration or sanctions. This needs more 
thought and investigation.
Networks take a variety of  forms, the basic idea being that of  informal 
coordination and cooperation between market participants, individuals 
or firms, who are ostensibly competitors in the market. Powell (1990), 
who has documented the importance of  networks in the craft, 
construction, publishing, film and recording industries in the United 
States, calls this ‘patterned exchange’ which ‘looks more like a marriage 
than a one‑night stand but there is no marriage licence, no common 
household, no pooling of  assets’. The network is a distinctive, semi‑
institutionalized form of  interaction which counteracts the workings of  a 
competitive market. (For a useful discussion of  the idea, see Granovetter 
1992: 9–13.) Examples would include collaborative ventures between 
firms, or agreements about market share or price based on reciprocity, 
trust and mutual dependence. Industrial economists have identified 
networks as a crucial ingredient in the success of  local industrial 
regions in Western Europe, notably the cases of  Baden-Württemberg 
in Germany and Emilia Romagna in Italy. (For example, see Schmitz 
1992, and Best 1990). Students of  East Asian business systems have 
also documented the crucial importance of  networks in coordinating 
activity between firms in Japan (in fact, Kumon 1992 has called Japan a 
‘network society’) and between business and government in China (Wank 
1992). In current discourse on industrial development, the economic 
role of  networks is regarded as positive, not the least because they have 
been identified as one component of  a number of  highly successful 
economic experiences in Western Europe and East Asia. As in the case 
of  formal associations, however, networks could well function as ways 
of  amassing unproductive rent as ‘conspiracies against the public’, so 
the phenomenon needs more investigation before any form of  policy 
prescription can be advanced with confidence.
Hierarchy: I am using Oliver Williamson’s word here (1975) to 
describe the most fundamental form of  social closure within the market, 
the firm. In Williamson’s view, the firm, and the hierarchy which it 
embodies, should be seen as an attempt to internalise transactions and 
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resource flows that might otherwise be conducted in a more costly 
fashion in the market; it is the substitution of  the visible hand of  the 
manager for the invisible hand of  the market. In other words, firms 
are ‘islands of  planned coordination in the sea of  market relations’ 
(Richardson 1972). While Williamson does not incorporate power into 
his analysis, the firm is in fact acting as a ‘governance structure’ (Coase 
1937) and as such is a node of  power and a rich field of  micropolitics 
– of  authority, control, cooperation and domination. From a power 
perspective, the firm can be seen as a kind of  ‘combat unit’ designed 
for battle in the market; hierarchical controls operate internally to 
maintain the discipline necessary to carry on the market struggle, 
competitive or otherwise, in ways which are economically advantageous 
to the firm’s owners, private or otherwise (in the Marxist tradition 
this involves the extraction of  surplus value). The firm expands and 
contracts, and changes its ‘foreign policy’ and internal organization in 
response to changing conditions in the market. As recent discussion of  
the rise of  ‘post-Fordism’ in the industrialized countries has suggested, 
the relationship between the micro-politics of  markets at the firm level 
and the politics and economics of  markets at meso/macro levels is 
interactive and highly dynamic.
π3 The Politics of Market Structure
This is a conception of  markets as a structure of  power relations between 
agents with differential control over market-relevant material and 
mental assets. At the micro level, participants come to specific markets 
with unequal endowments in terms of  resources (cf. Sen’s notions of  
capabilities and entitlements; 1984, chaps. 13 and 20). At the macro 
level, this results in widely different market structures characterized by 
more or less equal or unequal power; each specific structure of  power 
conditions the way markets operate at the macro‑level, shapes the 
character of  exchange relations between individual market participants 
and influences their relative returns from exchange. As Bardhan points 
out in a recent paper on power in economics (1991:267), ‘power may 
be centrally involved in causing the existing pattern (and in defining 
the existing parameters) of  trade in the first place’. This idea is also 
present in Bhaduri’s idea of  ‘forced commerce’ wherein ‘the “market 
mechanism” is… better understood not in terms of  its allocative 
efficiency, but as the mechanism for extraction of  surplus by one class 
from another… the function of  exchange is not to “clear” the market 
in some cases, but simply to gain advantage to one party at the cost of  
another’; he talks about the ‘class efficiency’ of  markets.
Whereas in π1 and π2, we were looking at the transcendence of  market 
exchanges by means of  conscious, organized political action, in π3 the 
politics is a process which is one aspect of  the relationship between 
market participants in the act of  exchange, operating whatever the 
degree of  competitiveness within that market. Markets can thus be 
analysed as political games in which outcomes are structured in terms 
of  choices taken in the context of  variable but structured asymmetries 
in the capacities of  participants, which vary across specific markets and 
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which may in certain contexts result in systematic exploitation through 
unequal exchange. Dyadic market exchanges may thus be expressions 
of  relations between dominant and subordinate classes.
Conventional economic analysis, through its work on monopoly, 
oligopoly and ‘market power’, and more recently game theoretical work 
on bargaining within markets, has made some limited contribution 
to understanding this process. (For assessments, see Bardhan 1991 
and the article by Baland and Platteau in this Bulletin.) In the context 
of  agricultural markets, the work by Indian economists on ‘fused’ or 
‘interlocking’ markets involving ‘triadic power relations’ (for example, 
Bhaduri 1986 and Bharadwaj 1974, discussed by Janakarajan and 
Olsen in this Bulletin) has analysed the ways in which the interlocking 
of  markets for credit, product, leasing, labour, processing and 
transportation in rural contexts serves to give certain strategically 
situated groups an ability to dominate transactions with other market 
actors and benefit from unequal exchange. As a means to track these 
locations of  strategic control, the method of  tracing filières is useful in 
that it identifies the chain of  exchange from production through various 
links in marketing, processing and circulation. A filière map helps one 
to pinpoint precise locations of  profit and accumulation (for example, 
Barker (1989) has argued that trade is a more favourable location than 
production for accumulation in agricultural markets in Africa) and 
thereby identify precise points at which privileged positions can form 
and, more generally, relations between super‑ and subordinate classes or 
strata can coalesce.
The above models of  ‘fused’ and ‘interlocking’ markets are limited in 
their application because they have emerged from and been applied 
to relatively undeveloped agrarian markets still in transition from 
pre‑capitalist systems of  economic exchange. However, recent work in 
the Marxian tradition on more advanced markets in the industrialized 
countries has attempted to demonstrate how asymmetrical power 
relations exert influence, and domination and exploitation take place, 
in markets which are operating in ways more closely approximating the 
standard model of  a competitive market. For example John Roemer 
(1982, 1988) has argued that ‘capitalist exploitation’ takes place within 
a context of  ‘free’, ‘voluntary’ competitive exchange by virtue of  
unequal ownership of  property. In their theory of  ‘contested exchange’, 
Samuel Bowles and Herb Gintis (1990) have attempted to establish ‘new 
micro‑foundations for political economy, one that illuminates rather 
than obscures the exercise of  power’. There is also work on international 
exchange by David Evans where he argues (1990: 1295) that ‘systematic 
consideration of  class, inequality and power can be brought to bear on 
trade and development issues without loss of  analytical rigour’.
From the point of  view of  a strict economist, this last methodological 
point is important since one of  the usual arguments against the 
incorporation of  power into economic analysis is that it cannot be 
done rigorously. However, conventional analyses of  monopoly and 
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game‑theoretical approaches have far more potential for incorporating 
a rigorous analysis of  power than they have so far demonstrated. The 
triadic power relations characteristic of  interlocked markets have been 
modelled formally by Subramanian (as an appendix to Janakarajan 
1992) and it has been suggested that the methodology of  neo‑classical 
economics can provide a precise and empirically testable measure 
of  power by extending the theory of  monopoly (Ritson 1977). One 
is tempted to conclude that it is really a question of  whether or not 
economists are willing to put their minds to it. A ‘power theoretic’ and a 
‘choice theoretic’ approach seem logically inextricable and empirically 
necessary. Take the prisoners’ dilemma, for instance, – the dilemma 
lies not merely in the fact that their choices have sub‑optimal outcomes, 
but also in the fact that they are prisoners in the first place.
π4 The Politics of Social ‘Embeddedness’ 
This idea is drawn from (but goes beyond) Karl Polanyi’s notion (1957) 
of  markets as ‘embedded’ in wider social values and institutions. It 
implies that other principles of  social organization permeate markets and 
shape their structure and dynamics. It also implies that the motives of  
market actors cannot be reduced to mere considerations of  maximising 
self-interest and making profit. The latter sentiment is echoed in de 
Gregori’s exasperated remark (1979: 55) that ‘the economic man in the 
marketplace of  conventional economics is an individual without culture 
and therefore without existence’. Much recent analysis, for example, 
has emphasized the crucial importance of  trust and moral conceptions 
such as fairness or duty in regulating exchange between actors in a wide 
variety of  markets in more ‘traditional’ and more ‘modern’ contexts. 
(For a discussion of  these issues, see Granovetter 1992: 58–63.)
The notion of  embeddedness opens up a vast area of  interaction 
between markets and social processes, uniting the terrain of  economics 
with the traditional concerns of  anthropologists, sociologists and 
psychologists: kinship systems, cultural values, religious beliefs and 
institutions, social differentiation based on gender, ethnicity and race, 
and so on. My own concern here is far narrower: with the effect on 
the operation of  markets of  the power relations which may themselves 
be embedded in these social beliefs and institutions. One example is 
the impact of  gender on the role of  women within markets – both 
materially through the influence of  the gender division of  labour in 
the economy at large and attitudinally through the influence of  gender 
ideologies inherent in established cultural or religious beliefs. (For an 
analysis, see the article by Alison Evans in this Bulletin.) These social 
factors often operate to subordinate women by restricting their access 
to markets, limiting the resources they can use in market exchange, 
defining rules of  the market game which are prejudicial to their interests 
and distributing them invidiously between markets. From this point of  
view, markets are one social arena in which the pervasive power game 
between male and female interests is played out. Similar analyses could 
deal, for instance, with the role of  race in the operation of  markets in 
South Africa, or the role of  religion in the operation of  markets in Iran.
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3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
At the analytical level, we hope to have convinced the reader that real 
markets are social amalgams interacting with and pervaded by the state 
and society at large, and political entities permeated by power relations 
of  diverse kinds. Though we have described the political nature of  
markets in terms of  four separate categories, there are, of  course, 
complex ‘boundary exchanges’ between them. For example, while we 
have emphasized the impact of  state politics (π1) on markets, we have 
not discussed the ways in which the associational politics of  π2 affect 
state politics (for example, through the influence of  powerful economic 
lobbies on officials or the ‘pull’ exerted by personal networks linking 
business people and politicians). There is also a systematic relationship 
between the power relations of  π3 and the associational possibilities of  
π2: a small group of  large landlords, for example, may well find it easier 
and more productive to organize in their own interests than a much 
larger number of  small tenants. The power definitions and distribution 
inherent in a religiously-based caste system (in category π4) may well 
structure the allocation of  market power in π3. We can thus conceive of  
class formation in political terms as the result of  a process of  mutually 
enforcing interaction between power differentials in these four spheres. 
By contrast, power relations in each sphere may be in conflict, as when 
powerful trade‑unions arise to challenge the power vested in unequal 
ownership of  the means of  production, or when workers influence state 
power, through votes or revolution, to secure regulation of  markets in 
their interests or to bring about a redistribution of  marketable assets 
(as through land reform). Using these categories, we can also approach 
the explanation of  market institutions in political terms, as a necessary 
complement to theories which stress transaction costs or information. 
Market institutions can be seen as a consequence and expression of  
power relations and political struggle in and between these four areas of  
market politics.
But does the political analysis of  markets have any practical value for 
the world of  development in which analysis exists for the purposes of  
action? In relation to successful policy intervention, it should caution 
against operating with too starveling or utopian a conception of  ‘the 
market’ or the ‘free market’ and sensitize policy-makers to the structural 
and institutional diversity of  real markets and the complex political 
processes which shape and underpin them. Any one‑sided and/or 
economistic definition of  market ‘distortion’, for example, runs the 
risk of  coming up with simplistic policy conclusions which mis‑specify 
the problem and underestimate the possibilities of  change. It not only 
faces the familiar problem that, even where markets may be working 
‘well’, they may have unacceptable welfare consequences, for example 
by increasing the vulnerability of  the poor to market fluctuations. 
It also faces awkward questions about the existence of  apparently 
highly successful markets which are systematically ‘distorted’ in ways 
analysed above. There is here an important range of  questions about 
how variations in the power structuring of  specific markets affects 
developmental outcomes. This goes beyond the usual questions about 
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the nature and extent of  state regulation to include the ‘endogenous’ 
regulation of  markets: for example, the pervasiveness of  networks 
in Japanese or Italian industrial markets; the function of  industry/
trade associations in improving their members’ ability to compete 
in international markets; or the role of  professional organizations 
in regulating skilled‑labour markets. The problems for investigation 
here are why some of  these forms of  markets organization are 
developmentally beneficial and some not, and how the former can be 
encouraged and the latter discouraged through policy.
Moreover, the manipulation (and in the Eastern European case, the 
creation ex nihilo) of  markets through policy intervention would seem 
to require far more than the application of  an analytical blancmange 
mould derived from conventional economics: a knowledge of  context 
and variation, and of  the complex social, political and institutional 
dimensions of  real markets. As I remarked at the outset, variations in 
markets partly reflect a wider differentiation between market systems, 
between forms of  capitalism, which offers a range of  alternative 
institutional incarnations of  markets. (For an example of  this range of  
options in the context of  current Chinese financial reforms, see Bowles 
and White 1993.) This variation does not bedevil analysis because these 
variations and processes can be classified and analysed systematically, 
ideally through inter‑disciplinary endeavour.
REFERENCES
Bardhan, Pranab, 1991, ‘On the concept of  power in economics’, 
Economics and Politics, Vol 3 No 3, November: 265–277
Barker, Jonathan, 1989, Rural Communities Under Stress, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Bharadwaj, K., 1974, Production Conditions in Indian Agriculture, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Bates, Robert H., 1981, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The 
Political Basis of  Agricultural Policies, Berkeley: University of  
California Press
Best, Michael H., 1990, The New Competition: Institutions of  
Industrial Restructuring, Cambridge: Polity Press
Bhaduri, A., 1986, ‘Forced commerce and agrarian growth’, World 
Development, Vol 14 No 2: 267–272
Bowles, Samuel and Gintis, Herbert, 1990, ‘Contested exchange: a new 
microfoundation for the political economy of  capitalism’, Politics 
and Society Vol 18 No 2, June: 165–222
Bowles, Paul and White, Gordon, 1993, Finance and Late 
Development: The Political Economy of  China’s Financial 
Reforms, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press
Cawson, Alan, 1988, ‘Closing ranks’, Times Higher Education 
Supplement, October 31: p33
Cawson, Alan et al., 1990, Hostile Brothers: Competition and Closure 
in the European Electronics Industry, Oxford: Clarendon Press
Coase, Ronald, 1937, ‘The nature of  the firm’, Economica, IV: 
386–405
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 2A November 2016: ‘States, Markets and Society – New Relationships for a New Development Era’ 45–58 | 57
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
DeGregori, T.R., 1979, ‘Power and illusion in the marketplace: 
institutions and technology’, in Warren J. Samuels, (ed.), The Economy 
as a System of  Power, New Jersey: Transaction Books: 53–64
Evans, David, 1989, ‘Alternative perspectives on trade and development’, 
in H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan, (eds), Handbook of  Development 
Economics, Vol II, Amsterdam: North-Holland: 1245–1304
Foucault, Michel, 1976, ‘Disciplinary power and subjection’, in Steven 
Lukes, (ed.), Power, Oxford, Basil Blackwell: 229–243, reprinted 
from his Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings 1972-1977, edited by Colin Gordon, Pantheon Books
Granovetter, Mark, 1992, ‘The sociological and economic approaches 
to labor market analysis: a social structural view’, in Granovetter and 
Swedborg, (eds), op.cit.: 233–264
Granovetter, Mark and Swedborg, Richard, (eds), 1992, The Sociology 
of  Economic Life, Oxford: Westview Press 
Janakarajan, S., 1992, ‘Triadic exchange relations: an illustration 
from South India’, paper presented at the CIRAD Workshop on 
‘Commodity Exchange and Food Systems in Developing Countries: 
Processes and Practices’, Mèze, France, August 31–September 4, 1992
Kumon, Shumpei, 1992, ‘Japan as a network society’, in S. Kumon and 
Henry Rosovsky, (eds), The Political Economy of  Japan: Volume 3: 
Cultural and Social Dynamics, Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press: 109–141
Lukes, Steven, (ed.), 1986, Power, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Mackintosh, Maureen, 1990, ‘Abstract markets and real needs’, in 
Henry Bernstein et al., (eds), The Food Question: Profits versus 
People?, London: Earthscan Publications: 43–53
Parkin, Frank, 1979, Marxism and Class Theory: a Bourgeois 
Critique, London: Tavistock
Richardson, G.B., 1972, ‘The organization of  industry’, Economic 
Journal, 82: 883–896
Ritson, C., 1977, Agricultural Economics: Principles and Policy, BSP 
Professional Books
Roemer, John, 1982, A General Theory of  Exploitation and Class, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
Roemer, John, 1988, Free to Lose: an Introduction to Marxist 
Economic Philosophy, London: Radius
Schmitz, Hubert, 1992, ‘On the clustering of  small firms’, IDS Bulletin, 
Vol 23 No 3, July: 64–69
Sen, Amartya, 1984, Resources, Values and Development, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell
Wank, David, ‘Symbiotic alliance of  entrepreneurs and officials: the 
logics of  private sector expansion in a South China city’, paper 
presented at a conference on ‘Political Consequences of  Departures 
from Central Planning’, New York State, August 26–30
Weber, Max, (1922)1978, Economy and Society: An Outline of  
Interpretive Sociology, Berkeley: University of  California Press
Williamson, Oliver E., 1975, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and 
Antitrust Implications, New York: Free Press
This page is intentionally left blank
Vol. 47 No. 2A November 2016: ‘States, Markets and Society – New Relationships for a New Development Era’
58 |  White Towards a Political Analysis of Markets
